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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the impact of additional reimbursement instruments on the 
diffusion of new technologies in inpatient care. Using 2010-2014 German panel data on hospital 
level for every patient undergoing coronary angioplasty, this study examines the utilisation of 
drug-eluting balloon catheters (DEB) over time while additional payment instruments changed. 
Hypothesising that the utilisation of DEB increased abruptly when a new reimbursement 
instrument came into force, we estimate a fixed effects regression comparing years with a 
change and years where the reimbursement instrument remained the same. The model is 
adjusted for patient age and severity of the disease. The utilisation of DEB increased from 8,407 
in 2010 to 19,065 in 2014. Hospitals used significantly more DEB when an additional payment 
instrument changed compared to years when it remained the same. The increase was roughly 
twice as large. In short, hospitals are incentivised to utilise new technologies if the 
reimbursement changes to an instrument that is designed in a more reliable way, e.g. including 
less bureaucracy or guaranteeing fixed prices. 
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Every reimbursement system generates both adverse and beneficial incentives [1]. The design 
and structure of reimbursement systems is hence a major concern in health systems. With the 
aim to incentivise hospitals to provide care more efficiently, health policy-makers and insurers 
have moved away from fee-for-service to prospective payment systems and capitation [2]. 
Today, inpatient care in most OECD countries is financed with prospective payment systems, 
reimbursing services based on predetermined average expenses for diagnosis-related groups 
(DRG) [3]. Hospitals thus face the risk to be reimbursed less than their actual expenses per 
patient [4]. There is general consensus that DRG payments incentivise hospitals to utilise those 
technologies that lead to lower costs per patient [5-7]. Previous health economics literature has 
assessed in how far reimbursement, especially prospective payment models, influences the 
adoption and diffusion of new technologies [8-12]. Cappellaro et al. do not find evidence that 
higher levels of reimbursement encourage technology diffusion for the case of drug-eluting 
stents in different Italian regions [9]. Romeo and colleagues [11] analysed effects of 
reimbursement programmes with and without prospective payment on the diffusion of five 
capital-embodies technologies (e.g. electronic fetal monitoring). They show that prospective 
reimbursement influenced the diffusion of technologies considered, but effects depend on the 
specific attributes of prospective reimbursement policy and the technology itself. Even though 
consequences of prospective payment systems have been discussed extensively [13, 14], 
additional reimbursement instruments of DRG systems have not received much research 
attention: Prior studies based on cross-sectional designs [15] and surveys [7, 16] found that 
additional payment instruments may incentivise the utilisation of a new technology. Scheller-
Kreinsen et al. [15] show that most of 12 investigated European countries used approaches of 
encouraging technological innovation [7]. Sorenson et al. [16] gave insides into the use of 
innovation payments of the National Health Service (NHS) in England from hospitals’ 
perspective. However, only one third of surveyed NHS hospital finance managers (n = 20) 
believe that these payments effectively encourage the adoption of new technologies. Baeumler 
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empirically examined factors that influence hospitals in their decision to use drug eluting stent 
in the treatment of acute myocardial infarction for patients of a large German sickness fund. 
Beside individual patient characteristics and hospital characteristics, the amount of additional 
payments was positively associated with the utilisation of drug eluting stents [15]. From a 
theoretical viewpoint, various studies have addressed the variation across hospitals adopting 
new technologies, while studies on individual hospitals adopting new technologies across time 
in the life cycle of a new technology is rather scarce. The incentive structure of additional 
reimbursement instruments for individual hospitals is, however, an essential aspect, as they are 
designed with the intention of balancing disincentives of DRG systems that might dominate 
decision-making authority [17-18].  
The present longitudinal study analyses technology utilisation of hospitals over time across 
three different additional reimbursement instruments using fixed effects modelling. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that examines the utilisation of new technologies in inpatient 
care while different reimbursement instruments are in place. We hypothesise that the utilisation 
of technologies increased abruptly when a new additional reimbursement instrument came into 
force.We study the effect by investigating hospitals’ utilisaton of drug-eluting balloon catheters 
(DEB) between 2010 and 2014, while additional payment instruments changed twice within this 
time period.  
2 Background 
Studying the influence of incentives on human and organisational behaviour has become a core 
discipline in economic thought [19]. The initial idea in the theory of incentives is to recognise 
that contracts between principals and agents are linked to conflicting interests and unevenly 
distributed bargaining powers between the two parties, as Adam Smith observed first for wage 
contracts in agriculture [20, 21]. Chester Barnard proposed that persuasion and tangible 
incentives are the relevant elements convincing subordinates in a system to cooperate. He 
defined four specific kinds of incentives, namely financial and material ones, non-material 
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opportunities, physical work conditions and benefactions [19, 22]. In the context of reimbursing 
inpatient care and especially when focussing on the diffusion of new technologies, both decision 
makers on policy and insurance level are acting as principals and (dis)incentivise hospitals to 
use new technologies. While the former is responsible for setting the frameworks for 
reimbursement, the latter is in power to negotiate additional payments. Reimbursement systems 
hence involve intended incentives that are implemented to change hospital behaviour, such as 
the introduction of DRG systems aimed to incentivise hospitals to act efficiently and effectively 
[1]. In addition, once implemented, reimbursement systems also involve unintended incentives 
in a way that hospitals in their role as agents use the system for their benefit [13]. Regarding the 
bundling of payments within DRG systems, there is general consensus that a disincentive exists 
for new technologies to be utilised when they are associated with increased costs per admission 
[10,23]. Many health care systems using DRGs thus maintain additional reimbursement 
instruments. The aim is to balance disincentives for hospitals to use new medical technologies 
while remaining in control of the decision whether to reimburse a particular technology [24].  
The German DRG system bundles the expenses for infrastructure, services and materials. Their 
reimbursement rates are determined on the basis of diagnoses, procedures and patient 
characteristics such as age and gender [26]. Additional reimbursement instruments are installed 
for a technology when the incurred costs for a treatment vary substantially from standard 
payment rates. They are often used temporarily before a unique DRG is generated [7]. Varying 
in the particular design, previous literature has categorised additional reimbursement 
instruments as separate or supplementary payments: Separate payments are in most systems the 
first step to reimburse a new technology, sometimes before a procedure code has been assigned. 
They are negotiated locally or nationally at a time when information on the effectiveness of a 
technology is still relatively limited [25]. Supplementary payments are usually not limited to 
new technologies but include specific high-cost technologies to keep the DRG system more 
homogenous [7].  
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In the German inpatient reimbursement system, separate payments and two types of 
supplementary payments (supplementary payments with a negotiated price and supplementary 
payments with a nationally fixed price) are used. As the design of the additional payment 
instruments differs, the certainty and bureaucratic efforts for a hospital to receive a payment 
depend on the particular additional payment in place.  
Separate payments for certain technologies are only eligible for hospitals that (1) requested 
permission to negotiate payments at the Institute of the Hospital Remuneration System (InEK), 
(2) got a positive decision for the technology in question from the InEK, and (3) were able to 
negotiate a payment amount with representatives of the payers. As the InEK’s decision is valid 
for one year only, hospitals must request permission to negotiate payments at the InEK again for 
the next year if the technology in question fails to be included in the following year’s lists of 
supplementary payments or the G-DRG classification. A previous study has identified that one 
third of all German hospitals was able to negotiate payments for one or more technologies 
eligible for separate payments [27]. 
Negotiated supplementary payments are determined by the InEk for certain technologies listed 
as an annex to the DRG catalogue. Opposed to additional payments, every hospital is allowed to 
negotiate a payment with the representatives of payers without prior request to the InEK. 
However, in the case of no agreement, insurers have to pay a lump sum of 600 euros per case. 
Neither the amounts of negotiated supplementary payments nor the negotiated amounts of 
separated payments are made public. 
Lastly, fixed supplementary payments are the most reliable instrument for hospitals. The InEK 
sets a nationally fixed reimbursement price, i.e. all hospitals using the technology are eligible 
for remuneration without prior negotiation. While both kinds of supplementary payments are 
relevant for hospital budgets and volume thresholds will be negotiated, separate payments are, 
in theory, budget-neutral [28]. However, one should bear in mind that the negotiation of 
separate payments usually takes place within budget negotiations so that they nonetheless might 
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have an indirect impact on the overall hospital budget even if volume thresholds for the 
technology are possible for separate payments. Table 1 outlines the main characteristics of 
German additional payments.  
Tab 1 Additional reimbursement instruments in German inpatient care  
In conclusion, the change of reimbursement instruments implies a higher certainty for hospitals 
to receive (i) a reimbursement at all and (ii) a prospective determined amount of reimbursement. 
The first aspect occurs when changing from separate to negotiated supplementary payments and 
the latter one when changing from negotiated to fixed supplementary payments. Bureaucratic 
hurdles for additional payments thus decline continuously.  
Based on the assumption that different additional payments instruments exert a varying degree 
of incentive for hospitals to adopt a technology, we selected a technology that was used by all 
additional payments systems consecutively for this study. Drug-eluting balloon catheters (DEB) 
are used in percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA, in the following also 
referred to as “angioplasty”) to treat coronary heart disease. After the first PTCA in 1977 [29] 
and its diffusion in the 1980s [30], bare-metal and then drug-eluting stents were developed to 
reduce frequent restenosis [31]. DEB have been developed since the mid 2000s and are 
considered to have advantages over drug delivery of stents due to their “broader area of surface 
contact and more homogenous drug-tissue transfer” [31]. One reason for selecting DEB are the 
sufficient number of angioplasty cases. Although age-standardised death rates had been 
decreased globally by 22 per cent between 1990 and 2013, cardiovascular and circulatory 
diseases are the primary cause of death in developed countries [32]. From an economic 
viewpoint, circulatory diseases account for more than 10 per cent of the health expenditures in 
OECD countries, which is the largest share of inpatient spending [33]. Most importantly, DEB 
are a suitable example to study the effects of additional reimbursement instruments as the 
technology was reimbursed in Germany by three different additional payments successively. In 
2010, the first year of observation, DEB could be reimbursed as separate payments if a hospital 
had negotiated successfully. In 2011 and 2012, the reimbursement changed to negotiated 
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supplementary payments. Hospitals either negotiated a payment or received a lump sum of € 
600 per utilised DEB. In 2013 and 2014, a nationwide fixed supplementary payment was set by 
the InEK. All private and public health insurances thus reimbursed this amount for a DEB 
utilisation. View the bottom part of Table 1 for further information of the reimbursement of 
DEB with additional payments across the years.  
Reimbursement for DEB were paid in addition to DRG payments. These DRG payments were, 
for instance, 5,780 euros on average when performing a PTCA (F58) with heavy complications 
or co-morbidities (CC) in 2014 and 2,920 euros for a PTCA without CC.
1
 Slightly less frequent 
are PTCA with complex diagnosis (F52), yielding between 4,375 and 6,982 euros depending on 
CC and PTCA with highly complex intervention (F56) to be reimbursed with 3,756 to 7,016 
euros. When using a DEB – being financed through fixed supplementary payments in this year 
– hospitals additionally received 836.37 euros. 
3 Methods 
3.1 Data 
The study is based on a nationwide hospital data set called DRG statistic, provided by the 
Research Data Centers of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder. 
The DRG statistic contains patient-level data comprising all treatments and patients in German 
hospitals. For the purpose of this study, all patients undergoing coronary angioplasty in a 
German hospital between 2010 and 2014 were extracted and aggregated at hospital level per 
year. According to the longitudinal study design, we investigate the technology adoption per 
hospital and year. It captures all inpatient cases from any health insurance in Germany, ensuring 
that there is no selection bias due to patient sampling.  
Relevant hospital cases were identified through the German procedure classification (OPS). We 
selected all treatments with the procedure code for angioplasty at the heart and coronary 
                                                           
1 DRG payment rates are calculated by multiplying the respective cost weight of a DRG with the national 
2014 average base rate of 3,156.82 euros, which in reality differed among the 16 federal states ranging 
from 1,113 and 3,325 euros. 
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circulation system (8-837.0), marking those with an additional procedure code for DEB. Since 
2011, the number of DEB used in a patient treatment has led to variations in the last digit of the 
procedure code. In this study, we do not differentiate if a patient received one or several DEB 
within the treatment. According to our research question, we analyse the effects of changing 
reimbursement instruments on hospital level. The DRG statistic defines a hospital as the entity 
that is bound by a budget agreement. In cases where a chain or network of hospitals is registered 
as one institution (i.e., with just one institutional code), it is considered to be one hospital. 
3.2 Variables 
In order to capture the utilisation of DEB most accurately, we used absolute and relative 
outcome measures for technology adoption. Dependent variables were the number of DEB per 
hospital and year in Model 1 and the share of DEB utilisations from all angioplasties per 
hospital and year in Model 2: 
(1)                             
                                                   
(2)                            
 
                                                
                                                     
 
To account for the effect of additional reimbursement instruments in the respective years, we 
included dummy variables of the years of observation into our model [34]. This enables us to 
compare years with changing reimbursement instruments (2011 and 2013) and years when the 
reimbursement instrument remained the same (2010, 2012 and 2014). We hypothesise that the 
increase in utilisation is higher in years with a change in the reimbursement instrument than in 
years without.  
Besides this main variable of interest, patient characteristics and the amount of reimbursement 
for the technology possibly influence the outcome and may vary over time. The explanatory 
variables as well as their hypothesised influence on the utilisation of DEB are listed in Table 2. 
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In order to include them as covariates, we first tested their within variation to confirm that the 
variables changed over time. 
Tab 2 Possible explanatory variables  
Regarding patient characteristics, we consider the average age and mean severity of the patient 
cases per hospital and year. The data set includes patients undergoing PTCA between 40 and 90 
years. Three observations of PTCA patients older than 90 years had to be excluded from the 
study due to reasons of data protection. To decrease multicollinearity among the predictor 
variables [36, 37], we standardised the age variable, rescaling it to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. We also tested to use a second degree polynomial of the age variable 
to account for a possible non-linear relationship between age and the outcomes [38]. Based on 
the r-square test, the quadratic form did not lead to better explanatory power. 
Besides that, the severity of a patient’s disease may influence the decision to utilise a new 
technology [10, 39]. The average severity across patient cases is measured by the case mix 
index (CMI), with many diffusion studies using the hospital or department CMI as covariate [9, 
39]. It is calculated by the sum of the DRG relative weights divided by the number of cases in a 
hospital or department, representing the average resource consumption. When focusing on one 
specific technology, however, an adequate severity measurement for treated patients has to be 
developed, as done by Cutler and Huckman. They modified an index from Mark et al. [30] and 
divided angioplasty patients into three categories depending on the number of vessels blocked 
more than 70 per cent and a possible blockage of the artery or the left main trunk [10]. 
Compared to such medical measure, the CMI links medical severity to economic complexity. 
As procedures and their complexity are one essential part of determining DRGs and their 
relative weights, the case mix has an impact on how much a hospitals gets reimbursed for its 
services [40]. We thus calculated hospital- and year-specific CMI for angioplasty patients based 
on the DRGs used in the observed patient cases as a proxy for the average severity of patients 
undergoing PTCA. 
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Lastly, the state-wide base rates determine the revenues from DRG payments to some extent, 
since the revenue is calculated by multiplying a DRG relative weight with the base rate [3]. 
Testing the within variation of the base rate suggested that the variable does not vary 
considerably between years. As it does not fulfil the criteria of time-variation for fixed effects 
regressions, we did not include this variable as covariate. Also the reimbursement amount of 
DEB could not be included as this information is only available for years of fixed 
supplementary payments. 
3.3 Econometric Model 
With the aim to assess the effect of changing reimbursement instruments on the utilisation of a 
new technology, we estimated a fixed effects regression, comparing the hospital’s individual 
within variation before and after payment instruments changed. This approach is especially 
relevant for studying the adoption of new technologies since an extensive list of possible 
influencing factors exist that may lead to confounding [38]. Some factors are difficult to 
adequately control for, such as a patient’s preference for a specific treatment and the physician’s 
schools of thought. Since such factors influence a hospital in 2010 equally as in 2014, they do 
not bias the data estimation in the pre-post comparison of longitudinal research [41]. This is also 
the case for hospital characteristics such as number of beds per hospital, hospital ownership and 
university status. Keeping external factors constant, one can thus grasp longitudinal fixed 
effects regressions as approximation to an experimental logic [42]. Besides this contentual 
reasoning, we additionally conducted the Hausman test to ascertain that the fixed effects model 
was appropriate compared to a random effects model [41].  
The regression can be written as the pooled model  
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where     is the outcome under investigation, with the index it indicating that y is subject to 
hospital-related and time-related explaining factors.    is the estimated effect (coefficient) of 
time-variant factor     and    is the estimation of the time-invariant factor   , taking on the 
same value for each time point. The error term     represents two parts, with    being the 
cumulated effects of non-observed time-invariant factors and     the deviation of individual 
measurements from the individual specific measurement series (idiosyncratic error) [42]. Panel 
data for fixed effects regressions are transformed by subtracting the mean [41], so that the 
values of the time-demeaned data do not refer to an absolute height but to the deviation of the 
unit-specific mean: 
                                                         
After the transformation, the linear regression (Model 1) is performed with ordinary least 
squares, the regression of the relative model (Model 2) is performed with a logit link.  
To correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the data set, we estimated the robust 
standard errors of the models [43]. The reported explanatory power (r-square) is taken from the 
standard linear regression instead of the fixed effects one, since the explanatory effects of the 
intercepts are removed in the estimation of the explanatory power in a fixed effect regression 
[44,45]. The likelihood ratio test was used to test the significance of model extensions and 
possible interactions. In order to compare the year coefficients with each other, we estimate the 
marginal effects mi of these variables [35]. The marginal effects represent the predicted means 
of DEB for each year. This also allows a direct contrast of the coefficients with measurements 
of significance. We used Stata 12.1 to estimate the regression models. 
4 Results 
The data set comprises 1,269,224 inpatient hospital admissions where a patient underwent 
PTCA in German hospitals between 2010 and 2014. Following the study purpose of analysing 
the effect of changing reimbursement instruments on the utilisation of DEB, the hospital 
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admissions were aggregated per hospital and year. Across the years, on average six per cent of 
the balloon catheters were drug-eluting ones, corresponding to more than 72,000 patient cases 
where DEB were utilised. This relates to one hospital using a mean of 396 DEB in 2010 and a 
mean of 569 DEB in 2014. Table 3 gives descrives statistics on the PTCA treatment performed 
in German hospitals between 2010 and 2014. 
Tab 3 Descriptive statistics on PTCA treatment in German hospitals from 2010 to 2014  
More than half of these were planned surgeries with referral from outpatient care and 40 per 
cent of the cases were emergencies. Less than 27 per cent of the patients treated with DEB were 
women, which is roughly the same share as for standard balloon catheters, i.e. non-eluting ones. 
The share of women is higher for older patients: while 16 percent of the patients aged 40-50 are 
women, they represent 45 per cent of the patients aged 80-90.  
The descriptive statistics reveal substantial differences between the increase of DEB utilisation 
rates and standard balloon catheters. The number of DEB utilisation increased from 8,407 in 
2010 to 19,065 in 2014, corresponding to an average yearly increase of 31.7 per cent. Standard 
balloon catheters increased by 2.5 per cent per year in average. The data set comprises 892 
hospitals that conducted angioplasties between 2010 and 2014. The number of individual 
hospitals utilising DEB increased from 396 in 2010 to 569 in 2014. Figure 1 shows the 
development of DEB utilisation over time: Graph 1a displays the total utilisation numbers of 
DEB for all hospitals included in the analysis per year and their relative increase from one year 
to the next. Graph 1b shows the average share of DEB utilisation within all PTCA interventions 
for all hospitals included in analysis. Additionally, Graph 1c displays the increase in the number 
of hospitals using DEB over the years including the relative increase of hospital from one year 
to the next. Graph 1d shows the development of the average number of DEB used per hospital 
and its relative increase. 
Fig 1 Descriptive statistics of drug-eluting balloons between 2010 and 2014 
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The descriptives suggest that the utilisation of DEB was higher in those years when a new 
statutory reimbursement instrument came into force (year 2011 and 2013) compared to years 
where it remained the same (years 2010, 2012, 2014). The transition probabilities from one year 
to the next reveal that 95.9 per cent of hospitals ever using one ore more DEB remained 
utilising them in the next period. Of those hospitals not using DEB in one period, 67.5 per cent 
continued not utilising DEB the following year. 
Table 4 provides the results from the panel regression for two endpoints: the number of DEB 
utilisations (Model 1) and the share of DEB utilisations from all PTCA (Model 2) per hospital 
and year. The regression estimates show a positive time trend in all regression models. The 
probability of coronary angioplasty patients treated with DEB was 80 per cent higher in 2011 
than in 2010 (logit = 1.39), significantly increasing from one year to the following (Model 2). 
The coefficient increased equally for the utilisation quantity (Model 1). 
Tab 4 Regression estimates with robust standard errors and 95% confidence intervals  
The predicted margins for the year variable indicate that a hospital used, on average, 11.6 DEB 
in 2010, 18.2 in 2011, increasing up to 28.0 in 2014, as displayed in Table 5. All predictive 
margins are significant at the 0.001 level in both models. Several aspects indicate that the 
increasing utilisation of DEB per year differs depending on a change of the reimbursement 
instrument. First of all, the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficient for 2011 overlapped with 
the confidence intervals for 2012 in the fixed effects regressions, as it is the case for 2013 and 
2014 (Table 4). In contrast, the confidence intervals are clearly distinct in those years when a 
change in reimbursement takes place. The overlapping confidence interval may indicate that the 
coefficients are not significantly different, which we, however, cannot conclude based on this 
[45]. To compare the coefficients between the years, we thus estimated the contrasts of the 
marginal linear predictions, as displayed in the lower section of Table 5.  
Tab 5 Predictive margins and contrasts of marginal linear predictions of the year-covariate  
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The same hospital used on average 6.63 DEB more in 2011 than in 2010, followed by 2.66 DEB 
more in 2012 versus 2011. Compared to the large difference in the first year of observation and 
the declined difference in the second, the difference increases again for 2013 versus 2012, when 
a new reimbursement instrument was introduced. It drops again for the following period when 
the reimbursement remained the same. The difference in the utilisation of DEB between 2010 
and 2011 and between 2012 and 2013 was much larger than in the other years of observation. 
The effect decreased over time. The first period with a change of the reimbursement was larger 
than the second (6.63 compared with 4.94) and equally the first period without changing 
reimbursement was larger than the second (2.66 compared to 2.16). From a transitional 
perspective, 95.5 per cent of the hospitals ever using DEB remained using the technolgy in the 
next period. For those who did not use DEB in one period, 67.5 per cent remain not using them 
in the next.  
We adjusted the model for the average severity of the disease and the average age of those 
treated with a DEB in the respective hospital and year. The association between the case mix 
index of the treated patients and a hospital’s utilisation of DEB is negative and significant at the 
0.05 level. This suggests that the number of patients treated with DEB is lower in hospitals with 
a higher case mix index, meaning that DEB were rather utilised in hospitals with a lower 
average severity of patients.  
Overall, 85 per cent of the variance of the number of DEB can be explained by the covariates in 
Model 1 and 43 per cent of the variance of the share of DEB from all PTCA can be explained by 
the covariates in Model 2.  
5 Discussion 
Most OECD countries use additional reimbursement instruments to finance new health 
technologies in DRG systems, varying in the design and detailed structure of the mechanisms in 
place [7, 25]. This study analysed the effects of changing reimbursement instruments on the 
utilisation of new health technologies. We focused on the variation across time, revealing how a 
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hospital uses a new technology when additional reimbursement instruments change. Based on 
data of all patient cases treated with coronary angioplasty in German hospitals between 2010 
and 2014, we found that changes in the additional reimbursement instruments cause a larger 
increase in the utilisation of drug-eluting balloon catheters (DEB) than in years when the 
payment instrument remains the same. We conducted several robustness checks within the 
framework of this study and this result was robust to each and every analysis conducted.  
This observation suggests that the design of payment instruments generates incentives for 
technology adoption of hospitals. The more predictable and less beaurocratic it is to receive the 
payments, the larger the incentive to use a technology. The incremental increase in the use 
enables hospitals to gain more experiences with the new technology before utilising it in a 
broader scale.  
The clear results were to some extent unexpected, since payment instruments are not primarily 
aimed at providing incentives but instead at reimbursing the new technology adequately for a 
hospital to utilise a new technology cost-neutrally. However, evidence on safety and 
effectiveness is in general the most important point in utilising technologies. Although stricter 
approval regulations for medical devices at EU level have been implemented until mid 2020 
(Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017), 
there is still a lack of evidence in routine care in the German health system. Generating 
evidence, especially in the early product livecycle, should be included in decisions and therefore 
in the design of payment instruments. Separate payments for certain high risk technologies have 
been under such framework of coverage with evidence development since a policy change in 
2016. Having observed that the design of financial payment instruments is associated with the 
utilisation of technologies, generating additional evidence might be an useful design element 
also for supplementary payments, that provides further decision tools (1) for hospitals regarding 
the utilisation of technologies as well as (2) for payers regarding coverage and payment 
decisions.  
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Besides that, it should be examined whether the results from the study can be applied to other 
technologies. DEB were a step-by-step development in a previously developed procedure. It 
thus does not involve a learning process as for an entirely new surgical procedure, so that no 
additional resources of physicians and hospitals beyond the technology cost are needed. Our 
results may be transferable to similar technologies moving through the different additional 
reimbursement instruments. The observed effects might differ when studying the utilisation of 
so-called “disruptive technologies”, i. e. when no previous similar procedures or products exist 
[47]. We would expect that the diffusion would then be more focused on few early adopters 
among physicians. 
Studying the technology utilisation of hospitals in a pre-post-comparison, we do not assess what 
institutional or external characteristics increase the likelihood of technology adoption. A 
previous study showed that being a larger hospital, a university hospital as well as being located 
in an area with a high degree of competition increases the chance for a hospital to negotiate 
additional payments with health insurances [27]. As this study is based on Germany-wide 
hospitals, it is plausible that the hospitals adopting DEBs in our study share these 
characteristics.  
Concerning methodological assumptions for a causality of the results, the strict exogeneity 
assumption is fulfilled if the idiosyncratic error is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable 
across all time periods [48]. This assumption is relaxed to some extent in fixed effects models, 
since only time-variant unobserved factors need to be considered. Possible unobserved factors 
that coincide with utilising DEB could be a growing evidence of the effectiveness of DEB and 
the availability of the technology [49]. In fact, the European guideline for myocardial 
revascularisation from 2010 suggests that DEB “should be considered for the treatment of in-
stent restenosis” after prior treatment with bare metal stents. However, the recommendation was 
based on a low level of evidence and the class of recommendation showed that there was 
conflicting evidence [50]. By 2014 the level of evidence was considered to be class A 
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(“procedure is beneficial, useful, effective”) and class I of recommendation, recommending the 
use of DEB “for the treatment of in-stent restenosis within bare metal stents or drug-eluting 
stents” [51]. However, the change of the level of evidence does not coincide with the change in 
reimbursement instruments: Technologies are usually covered as separate payments for around 
two or three years. A technology is often transferred to the system of supplementary payments 
or included in the DRG classification at some point. This depends on different criteria that have 
not been made public by the InEK. However, the change from a negotiated supplementary 
payment to a fixed supplementary payment requires a sufficient number of patients to receive 
DEB and allows only for minimal variation in calculated costs to determine a fixed 
supplementary payment. In other words, if the number of patients for which DEB has been used 
is too low or variations in the calculated costs are too great, negotiated supplementary payments 
are used instead [52]. Secondly, the panel-attrition bias is a challenge for causal effects in 
unbalanced data sets [34]. The reason why hospitals left the sample (“attrition”) must be 
uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error. In our case, hospitals appear in one year but not in 
another if they merged or closed down in the meantime. The financing of DEB, even when 
taking all additional reimbursement instruments together, is by far too small and insignificant 
from overall hospital bills to be correlated with a hospital merging or closing down. It is also 
not convincing that hospitals in the data set treated patients with coronary angioplasty in some 
years but none in others, since coronary angioplasty is one of the major treatments of cardiology 
departments. These considerations make it unlikely that the panel-attrition bias influences the 
results. In short, we designed the study carefully to eliminate threats to causality.  
Nonetheless, this study is subject to certain limitations. First of all, hospitals may utilise a 
technology without receiving a payment, which would still appear in the data as we selected the 
observation based on the procedure code. Due to cost pressures in the DRG system, this 
possibility can rather be excluded in reality. A frequent challenge of studies based on billing 
data is possible upcoding of DRGs due to financial incentives [53]. While there may be some 
hospitals doing more upcoding than others especially in the field of patient severity, this effect 
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is mostly time-invariant and thus probably does not influence the results of the study to a 
relevant extent. Also, we probably underestimate the number of DEB in the final year of 
observation: The DRG data defines years by date of the hospital discharge. Since our last data 
year is 2014, patients who were hospitalised and treated in 2014 but discharged in 2015 do not 
appear in our data. This is, however, a limited effect given the short length of stay of PTCA and 
refers to about 1.3 per cent of the patients. Finally, a threat to diffusion studies is the prevalence 
of right censoring [6], meaning that non-adopters are included in the study who are not in the 
position to utilise the new technology. This would be the case for hospitals that do not make the 
decision between the old and the new technology in the first place, for instance because they do 
not meet some legal requirement for utilisation of the new one. Since the new and old 
technology in this study are used in the same procedure and in the same way, we do not see any 
reason why right-censoring should have occurred. Thus, using rigorous econometric analysis of 
longitudinal nationwide data, this study presents strong evidence that additional payment 
instruments exert incentives to utilise technologies. 
6 Conclusion 
The results of the present study substantially contribute to research on the diffusion of medical 
technologies by investigating the effect of changing additional payments on the utilisation of 
new technologies with higher costs than standard DRG rates in inpatient care. Using 
longitudinal nationwide data on hospital level, the analysis of the utilisation of drug-eluting 
balloon catheters (DEB) in the treatment of coronary heart disease shows that additional 
reimbursement instruments cause an increase in technology utilisation. The study confirms that 
additional payment instruments are generally embraced by hospitals and are appropriate to 
regulate technology diffusion, while they exert incentives themselves. In particular the different 
designs and intentions of the additional payment instruments thus have an impact on the 
utilisation of technologies. Since these incentives are of bureaucratic and financial nature, they 
may not be in line with medical decision making. At early times of technology diffusion with a 
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high level of uncertainty regarding adverse events and the effectiveness of technologies, health 
systems have to consider approaches to generate evidence while reimbursing technologies by 
health insurances to balance the financial incentives.  
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